Nobel Symposium On Coin As Well As Banking Solar Daytime 2
Kamis, 19 September 2019
Academic Articles,
Banking,
Debt,
Economists,
Euro,
European Debt Crisis,
Finance,
Financial Reform,
Inflation,
Interesting Papers,
Macro,
Monetary Policy,
Talks,
Thesis topics
Edit
last post covered Day 1 on banking.)
Bernanke
Sadly Ben Bernanke's video as well as slides are non upward on the website. Ben showed some really interesting evidence that the crisis was an unpredictable run, rather than the usual even out nigh predictable defaults resulting from also much credit. Things actually did acquire all of a abrupt a lot worse inwards September as well as Oct 2008. Yes, it's slow to tell this is defense strength against the accuse that he should direct keep done to a greater extent than ahead of time. But evidence is evidence, as well as I disclose it quite plausible that the relatively pocket-sized losses inwards subprime demand non direct keep caused such a massive crisis as well as recession absent a run. Ben says the cloth is purpose of a newspaper he volition unloosen soon, so aspect for it. One tin sack empathise that Bernanke is careful nigh releasing less than perfect drafts of papers as well as videos.
History
Barry Eichengreen gave a scholarly occupation concern human relationship of why history matters, especially the cracking depression, as well as nosotros should pay to a greater extent than attending to it. (Paper, video.) He aimed squarely at typical economists whose noesis stopped at Friedman as well as Schwartz, or perchance Ben Bernanke's famous non-monetary channels paper, inwards which banking concern failures propagated the depression. He emphasized the purpose of the gilded criterion as well as international cooperation or non-cooperation, as well as warned against facile comparisons of the gilded criterion sense to today's events as well as the euro inwards particular.
Randy Kroszner has a cracking laid of slides and an engaging presentation. He also started on parallels amongst the cracking depression, as well as told good the even out of the the States default on gilded clauses. He closed amongst a alert nigh fighting the terminal state of war -- peculiarly apt given the exclusive focus of most of this conference on the events of 2008 -- as well as on how to start a crisis. In his stance when Bank of England Gov Mervyn King said: “We volition back upward Northern Rock." People hear "Northern Rock's inwards trouble? Run!" Likewise, inwards my view, speeches yesteryear President Bush as well as Treasury Secretary Paulson did a lot to spark the run inwards the US.
DSGE
Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 highlight for me, was the session on DSGE models.
Marty Eichenbaum (video, slides, subsequent paper) gave a prissy review of the electrical flow status of novel Keynesian DSGE models, as well as how they are developing inwards reaction to the financial crisis as well as recession, as well as the null outpouring episode.
Harald Uhlig
Critiques, or to a greater extent than just lists of outstanding puzzles as well as challenges, are often to a greater extent than memorable as well as novel than positive summaries, as well as Harald Uhlig delivered a clear as well as memorable one. (Video, Slides)
Asset prices are a longstanding occupation inwards DSGE models. In typical linearized form, the quantity dynamics are governed yesteryear intertemporal substitution, as well as the asset prices yesteryear direct a opportunity aversion, as well as neither has much influence on the other. (I learned this from Tom Tallarini.) Rather obviously, our recent recession was all nigh direct a opportunity aversion -- people stopped consuming as well as investing, as well as tried to motility from person to authorities bonds because they were scared to death, non a abrupt laid on of thriftiness. There is a lot of electrical flow travel going on to essay to repair this deficiency, but it all the same lives inwards the nation of extensions of the model rather than the mainstream. Harald also points out a oftentimes ignored implication of Epstein-Zin utility, the utility index reflects all consumption as well as anything that enters utility
Financial frictions are blossoming inwards DSGE models, inwards 2 forms: First, HANK or "heterogenous agent" models, which add together things similar borrowing constraints as well as uninsurable risks so that the distribution of income matters, as well as inwards an eternal quest to brand the models travel to a greater extent than similar static ISLM. Second, inwards response to the financial crisis (see outset day!) stylized models of banking as well as intermediary finance are showing up. I'm all the same a fiddling puzzled that the to a greater extent than criterion time-varying direct a opportunity aversion purpose of macro-finance got ignored, (a plea here) but that is indeed what's going on.
The conundrum, hither every bit elsewhere inwards DSGE, is that the to a greater extent than people play amongst the models, the farther they acquire from their founding philosophy: macro models that practise utter nigh monetary policy, (now) financial crises, but that obey the Lucas rules: Optimization, budget constraints, markets, or, to a greater extent than deeply, structures that direct keep some hope of beingness policy invariant as well as so predictions that volition live the Lucas critique. Already, many ingredients such every bit Calvo pricing are convenient parables, but questionably realistic every bit policy-invariant.
Harald points out that since most of the frictions are imposed inwards a rather ad-hoc manner, neither volition they live policy-invariant. This is a deeper as well as to a greater extent than realistic hollo for than ordinarily realized. Every fourth dimension marketplace participants hitting a "friction," they tend to acquaint a agency around that friction so it doesn't wound them side yesteryear side time. Regulation Q on involvement rates was in 1 trial a "friction," as well as and so the coin marketplace fund was invented. The final result is also often "chicken papers:"
The understandable problem is, if you lot essay to microfound every unmarried friction from Deep Theory -- but why it is that credit bill of fare companies pose a limit on how much you lot tin sack borrow, inwards terms of asymmetric information, moral hazard, as well as so forth -- the audience volition live asleep long earlier you lot acquire to the data. Also, every bit nosotros saw inwards solar daytime 1, at that spot is (to pose it charitably) a lot of incertitude inwards but how contract or banking theory maps to actual frictions. I mean value we're stuck amongst ad-hoc frictions, if you lot want to acquire that route.
Harald's side yesteryear side hollo for is, I think, his most devastating, every bit it describes a huge hole inwards electrical flow models that is non (unlike the terminal two) a hollo for of immense electrical flow enquiry effort. The Phillips bend as well as inflation are the fundamental hollo for of the New Keynesian DSGE model -- as well as a disaster.
The Phillips bend is central. The hollo for of the model is for monetary policy to direct keep output effects. Money itself has (rightly) disappeared inwards the model, so the only channel for monetary policy to travel is via the Phillips curve. Interest rates modify inflation, as well as inflation causes output changes. No surprise, it is really difficult for that model to arrive at anything similar the terminal recession out of pocket-sized changes inwards inflation. (I direct keep to concur hither amongst the premise of the financial frictions stance -- if you lot want your model to arrive at the terminal recession, other than yesteryear 1 huge shock, the model needs something similar a financial crisis.)
The Phillips bend inwards the information is good known
Less good known, but worth lots of attention, is how the now criterion DSGE models completely neglect to capture inflation. Harald's slide:
The hollo for of the slide, inwards simpler form: The criterion Phillips bend is
Essentially all inflation is accounted for yesteryear the shock. The model is basically soundless nigh the source of inflation. Looking at the model every bit a whole, non but 1 equation, Neither monetary policy shocks nor changes inwards rules accounts for whatever pregnant amount of inflation.
I made a similar graph recently. Use the criterion iii equation model
Answer: Inflation as well as output would direct keep been virtually the same. The inflation of the 1970s as well as its conquest inwards the 1980s had zip to practise amongst monetary policy mistakes. It is exclusively the fault, as well as and so fortunate consequence, of "marginal cost" shocks that come upward from out of the model. This is a pretty uncomfortable prediction of a model designed to live nigh monetary policy! Or, every bit Harald pose it
Wait, you lot ask, what nigh Marty Eichenbaum's pretty graphs, such every bit this one, showing the effects of a monetary policy shock?
The answer: After a lot of work, the effects of a monetary policy shock look (at last) nigh similar what Milton Friedman said they should aspect similar inwards 1968. But monetary policy shocks don't occupation concern human relationship for whatever but a tiny purpose of output as well as inflation variation, quite contra Friedman (and Taylor, as well as many others') view.
Last, criterion novel Keyensian DSGE models direct keep potent "Fisherian" properties. In response to long lasting or expected involvement charge per unit of measurement rises, inflation goes up. More on this later.
Ellen McGrattan
Ellen stole the show. (Slides.) Take a break, as well as watch the video. She manages to live hilarious as well as incisive. And dissimilar the remainder of us, she didn't essay to sheohorn a 2 sixty minutes lecture into her xv minutes.
Her fundamental points. First, similar Harald, she points out that the models are driven yesteryear large shocks amongst less as well as less plausible structural interpretation, as well as thus farther from the Lucas critique solution than in 1 trial appeared to live the case. The shocks are actually "wedges," deviations from equilibrium weather condition of the model amongst unknown sources
What to do? Focus on rules as well as institutions. This is a deep point. Even DSGE modelers, inwards the want to speak to policy makers, often adopt the static ISLM presumption that policy is nigh actions, nigh decisions, whether to heighten or lower the funds rate. The other large Lucas hollo for is that nosotros should mean value nigh policy inwards terms of rules as well as institutions, non but actions.
Monetary policy as well as ELB
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé (slides, video) talked nigh the Fisherian possibility -- that raising involvement rates raises inflation. New-Keynesian DSGE models, amongst rational expectations, direct keep this property, especially for permanent or preannounced involvement charge per unit of measurement increases, as well as when at null involvement rates or otherwise inwards a passive regime where involvement rates practise non react to a greater extent than than 1 for 1 amongst inflation. She as well as Martin Uribe direct keep been advocating this possibility every bit a serious proposal for Europe as well as Nihon that want to heighten inflation.
She presented some prissy evidence that permanent increases inwards involvement rates practise increment inflation -- as well as correct away, non but inwards the long run.
Mike Woodford. (slides, video) gave a dense utter (37 slides, twenty minutes) on policy at the lower bound. During the ELB, fundamental banks moved from involvement rates to asset purchases as well as forwards guidance. Mike asks,
Mike's cost degree target is stochastic, changing optimally over fourth dimension to respond to shocks. I'm a fiddling skeptical that the fundamental banking concern tin sack notice as well as empathise such shocks, especially given the higher upward Uhlig-McGrattan give-and-take nigh the nature of shocks. Also, every bit I emphasize inwards comments, I'm dubious nigh the cracking powerfulness of promises of what the fundamental banking concern volition practise inwards the far time to come to cause output today. I'm a fan of cost degree targets, but on both sides, non but every bit stimulus, but for utterly different reasons.
Mike takes on rather skeptically the mutual option -- quantitative easing, asset purchases during the fourth dimension of the bound. He points out that to work, people direct keep to believe that the increment inwards coin is permanent, as well as won't live speedily withdrawn when the null outpouring is over. As evidence, he points to Japan:
Similarly, he likes the cost degree target over forwards guidance -- speeches inwards house of activity -- every bit it is a to a greater extent than credible commitment to practise things ex-post that the banking concern may non wishing to practise ex-post.
Finally, he addresses the puzzles of novel Keynesian models at the null outpouring -- forwards guidance has stronger effects the farther inwards the time to come is the promise; effects acquire larger every bit prices acquire less sticky, as well as so on. He argues that models should supplant rational expectations amongst a complex k-step iterated expectations rule.
Me.
Video, slides from Sweden, slides from my webpage, written version. I covered this inwards a previous weblog post, so won't repeat it all. I pose a lot of attempt inwards to it, as well as it summarizes a lot of what I've been doing inwards xv minutes flat, so I recommend it (of course). It also offers to a greater extent than perspective on higher upward points yesteryear Mike as well as Stephanie. My favorite line, referring to Mike's force for irrational expectations is something unopen to
Poor Emi had to acquire terminal inwards an exhausting conference of jet-lagged participants. She did a cracking chore (video, slides) roofing a century of monetary history as well as monetary ideas clearly as well as transparently. These are cracking slides to utilisation for an undergraduate or MBA shape on monetary policy, every bit well. An abbreviated list:
Postlude
Mon featured 2 panels, Macroeconomic enquiry as well as the financial crisis: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 critical assessment, amongst Annette Vissing-Jørgensen, Luigi Zingales, Nancy Stokey, as well as Robert Barro ; and Banking as well as finance enquiry as well as the financial crisis: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 critical assessment amongst Kristin Forbes, Ricardo Reis, Amir Sufi, as well as Antoinette Schoar.
Perhaps it's inwards the nature of panels, but I establish these a disappointment, especially compared to the stellar presentations inwards the chief conference. Also I mean value it would direct keep been improve to allow to a greater extent than (any, really) audience questions; the whole conference was a chip disappointing for lack of full general discussion, especially amongst such a stellar group.
In particular, Luigi led yesteryear excoriating the profession for non paying attending to housing problems as well as financial crises. I thought this a chip unfair as well as simultaneously short-sighted. He singled out monetary economic science textbooks, including Mike Woodford's, for omitting financial crises. Well, Mike omitted asteroid impacts too. It isn't a volume about financial crises. And, after lamabasting all of us, he said non 1 news nigh events since 2009. What are nosotros missing now? I had to stand upward up as well as inquire that rude question, over again suggesting that perchance nosotros are all non listening to Ken Rogoff this time. Annette went on to inquire something similar "don't you lot Chicago people believe inwards whatever regulation at all," as well as the respondents were also polite to tell what an unproductive inquiry that is as well as but motility on.
Again, I offering apologies to authors as well as discussants I didn't acquire to. The whole thing was memorable, but at that spot is only so much I tin sack blog! Do acquire to the site as well as aspect at the other sessions, according to your interests.
Bernanke
Sadly Ben Bernanke's video as well as slides are non upward on the website. Ben showed some really interesting evidence that the crisis was an unpredictable run, rather than the usual even out nigh predictable defaults resulting from also much credit. Things actually did acquire all of a abrupt a lot worse inwards September as well as Oct 2008. Yes, it's slow to tell this is defense strength against the accuse that he should direct keep done to a greater extent than ahead of time. But evidence is evidence, as well as I disclose it quite plausible that the relatively pocket-sized losses inwards subprime demand non direct keep caused such a massive crisis as well as recession absent a run. Ben says the cloth is purpose of a newspaper he volition unloosen soon, so aspect for it. One tin sack empathise that Bernanke is careful nigh releasing less than perfect drafts of papers as well as videos.
History
Barry Eichengreen gave a scholarly occupation concern human relationship of why history matters, especially the cracking depression, as well as nosotros should pay to a greater extent than attending to it. (Paper, video.) He aimed squarely at typical economists whose noesis stopped at Friedman as well as Schwartz, or perchance Ben Bernanke's famous non-monetary channels paper, inwards which banking concern failures propagated the depression. He emphasized the purpose of the gilded criterion as well as international cooperation or non-cooperation, as well as warned against facile comparisons of the gilded criterion sense to today's events as well as the euro inwards particular.
Randy Kroszner has a cracking laid of slides and an engaging presentation. He also started on parallels amongst the cracking depression, as well as told good the even out of the the States default on gilded clauses. He closed amongst a alert nigh fighting the terminal state of war -- peculiarly apt given the exclusive focus of most of this conference on the events of 2008 -- as well as on how to start a crisis. In his stance when Bank of England Gov Mervyn King said: “We volition back upward Northern Rock." People hear "Northern Rock's inwards trouble? Run!" Likewise, inwards my view, speeches yesteryear President Bush as well as Treasury Secretary Paulson did a lot to spark the run inwards the US.
DSGE
Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 highlight for me, was the session on DSGE models.
Marty Eichenbaum (video, slides, subsequent paper) gave a prissy review of the electrical flow status of novel Keynesian DSGE models, as well as how they are developing inwards reaction to the financial crisis as well as recession, as well as the null outpouring episode.
Harald Uhlig
Critiques, or to a greater extent than just lists of outstanding puzzles as well as challenges, are often to a greater extent than memorable as well as novel than positive summaries, as well as Harald Uhlig delivered a clear as well as memorable one. (Video, Slides)
Asset prices are a longstanding occupation inwards DSGE models. In typical linearized form, the quantity dynamics are governed yesteryear intertemporal substitution, as well as the asset prices yesteryear direct a opportunity aversion, as well as neither has much influence on the other. (I learned this from Tom Tallarini.) Rather obviously, our recent recession was all nigh direct a opportunity aversion -- people stopped consuming as well as investing, as well as tried to motility from person to authorities bonds because they were scared to death, non a abrupt laid on of thriftiness. There is a lot of electrical flow travel going on to essay to repair this deficiency, but it all the same lives inwards the nation of extensions of the model rather than the mainstream. Harald also points out a oftentimes ignored implication of Epstein-Zin utility, the utility index reflects all consumption as well as anything that enters utility
Financial frictions are blossoming inwards DSGE models, inwards 2 forms: First, HANK or "heterogenous agent" models, which add together things similar borrowing constraints as well as uninsurable risks so that the distribution of income matters, as well as inwards an eternal quest to brand the models travel to a greater extent than similar static ISLM. Second, inwards response to the financial crisis (see outset day!) stylized models of banking as well as intermediary finance are showing up. I'm all the same a fiddling puzzled that the to a greater extent than criterion time-varying direct a opportunity aversion purpose of macro-finance got ignored, (a plea here) but that is indeed what's going on.
The conundrum, hither every bit elsewhere inwards DSGE, is that the to a greater extent than people play amongst the models, the farther they acquire from their founding philosophy: macro models that practise utter nigh monetary policy, (now) financial crises, but that obey the Lucas rules: Optimization, budget constraints, markets, or, to a greater extent than deeply, structures that direct keep some hope of beingness policy invariant as well as so predictions that volition live the Lucas critique. Already, many ingredients such every bit Calvo pricing are convenient parables, but questionably realistic every bit policy-invariant.
Harald points out that since most of the frictions are imposed inwards a rather ad-hoc manner, neither volition they live policy-invariant. This is a deeper as well as to a greater extent than realistic hollo for than ordinarily realized. Every fourth dimension marketplace participants hitting a "friction," they tend to acquaint a agency around that friction so it doesn't wound them side yesteryear side time. Regulation Q on involvement rates was in 1 trial a "friction," as well as and so the coin marketplace fund was invented. The final result is also often "chicken papers:"
The understandable problem is, if you lot essay to microfound every unmarried friction from Deep Theory -- but why it is that credit bill of fare companies pose a limit on how much you lot tin sack borrow, inwards terms of asymmetric information, moral hazard, as well as so forth -- the audience volition live asleep long earlier you lot acquire to the data. Also, every bit nosotros saw inwards solar daytime 1, at that spot is (to pose it charitably) a lot of incertitude inwards but how contract or banking theory maps to actual frictions. I mean value we're stuck amongst ad-hoc frictions, if you lot want to acquire that route.
Harald's side yesteryear side hollo for is, I think, his most devastating, every bit it describes a huge hole inwards electrical flow models that is non (unlike the terminal two) a hollo for of immense electrical flow enquiry effort. The Phillips bend as well as inflation are the fundamental hollo for of the New Keynesian DSGE model -- as well as a disaster.
The Phillips bend is central. The hollo for of the model is for monetary policy to direct keep output effects. Money itself has (rightly) disappeared inwards the model, so the only channel for monetary policy to travel is via the Phillips curve. Interest rates modify inflation, as well as inflation causes output changes. No surprise, it is really difficult for that model to arrive at anything similar the terminal recession out of pocket-sized changes inwards inflation. (I direct keep to concur hither amongst the premise of the financial frictions stance -- if you lot want your model to arrive at the terminal recession, other than yesteryear 1 huge shock, the model needs something similar a financial crisis.)
The Phillips bend inwards the information is good known
The hollo for of the slide, inwards simpler form: The criterion Phillips bend is
inflation today = beta x expected inflation side yesteryear side twelvemonth + kappa x output gap + shock
Essentially all inflation is accounted for yesteryear the shock. The model is basically soundless nigh the source of inflation. Looking at the model every bit a whole, non but 1 equation, Neither monetary policy shocks nor changes inwards rules accounts for whatever pregnant amount of inflation.
I made a similar graph recently. Use the criterion iii equation model
Now, utilisation actual information on output y, inflation pi, as well as involvement charge per unit of measurement i, to dorsum out the shocks v. Turn off the monetary policy daze vi = 0. Solve the model as well as plot the information -- what would direct keep happened if the Fed had exactly followed the Taylor rule?
- Data: no Phillips-Curve tradeoff.
- QDSGE: don’t occupation concern human relationship for inflation amongst monetary policy shocks.
- The NK / Phillips-Curve-based NK QDSGE models may thus provide a misfortunate guide for monetary policy.
Wait, you lot ask, what nigh Marty Eichenbaum's pretty graphs, such every bit this one, showing the effects of a monetary policy shock?
Last, criterion novel Keyensian DSGE models direct keep potent "Fisherian" properties. In response to long lasting or expected involvement charge per unit of measurement rises, inflation goes up. More on this later.
Ellen McGrattan
Ellen stole the show. (Slides.) Take a break, as well as watch the video. She manages to live hilarious as well as incisive. And dissimilar the remainder of us, she didn't essay to sheohorn a 2 sixty minutes lecture into her xv minutes.
Her fundamental points. First, similar Harald, she points out that the models are driven yesteryear large shocks amongst less as well as less plausible structural interpretation, as well as thus farther from the Lucas critique solution than in 1 trial appeared to live the case. The shocks are actually "wedges," deviations from equilibrium weather condition of the model amongst unknown sources
What to do? Focus on rules as well as institutions. This is a deep point. Even DSGE modelers, inwards the want to speak to policy makers, often adopt the static ISLM presumption that policy is nigh actions, nigh decisions, whether to heighten or lower the funds rate. The other large Lucas hollo for is that nosotros should mean value nigh policy inwards terms of rules as well as institutions, non but actions.
Monetary policy as well as ELB
Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé (slides, video) talked nigh the Fisherian possibility -- that raising involvement rates raises inflation. New-Keynesian DSGE models, amongst rational expectations, direct keep this property, especially for permanent or preannounced involvement charge per unit of measurement increases, as well as when at null involvement rates or otherwise inwards a passive regime where involvement rates practise non react to a greater extent than than 1 for 1 amongst inflation. She as well as Martin Uribe direct keep been advocating this possibility every bit a serious proposal for Europe as well as Nihon that want to heighten inflation.
She presented some prissy evidence that permanent increases inwards involvement rates practise increment inflation -- as well as correct away, non but inwards the long run.
Mike Woodford. (slides, video) gave a dense utter (37 slides, twenty minutes) on policy at the lower bound. During the ELB, fundamental banks moved from involvement rates to asset purchases as well as forwards guidance. Mike asks,
To what extent does this hateful that the entire conceptual framework of monetary stabilization policy needs to live reconsidered, for a earth inwards which ELB mightiness good travel on periodically to bind?In classic form, Mike sets the inquiry upward every bit a Ramsey problem. Given a DSGE model, what is the optimal policy, given that involvement rates are occasionally constrained? He derives from that occupation a cost degree target. The cost degree target works, intuitively, yesteryear committing the fundamental banking concern to a menses of extra inflation after the null outpouring ends. It is a pop shape of forwards guidance. The project design hither is to derive that formally every bit an optimal policy problem.
Mike's cost degree target is stochastic, changing optimally over fourth dimension to respond to shocks. I'm a fiddling skeptical that the fundamental banking concern tin sack notice as well as empathise such shocks, especially given the higher upward Uhlig-McGrattan give-and-take nigh the nature of shocks. Also, every bit I emphasize inwards comments, I'm dubious nigh the cracking powerfulness of promises of what the fundamental banking concern volition practise inwards the far time to come to cause output today. I'm a fan of cost degree targets, but on both sides, non but every bit stimulus, but for utterly different reasons.
Mike takes on rather skeptically the mutual option -- quantitative easing, asset purchases during the fourth dimension of the bound. He points out that to work, people direct keep to believe that the increment inwards coin is permanent, as well as won't live speedily withdrawn when the null outpouring is over. As evidence, he points to Japan:
Similarly, he likes the cost degree target over forwards guidance -- speeches inwards house of activity -- every bit it is a to a greater extent than credible commitment to practise things ex-post that the banking concern may non wishing to practise ex-post.
Finally, he addresses the puzzles of novel Keynesian models at the null outpouring -- forwards guidance has stronger effects the farther inwards the time to come is the promise; effects acquire larger every bit prices acquire less sticky, as well as so on. He argues that models should supplant rational expectations amongst a complex k-step iterated expectations rule.
Me.
Video, slides from Sweden, slides from my webpage, written version. I covered this inwards a previous weblog post, so won't repeat it all. I pose a lot of attempt inwards to it, as well as it summarizes a lot of what I've been doing inwards xv minutes flat, so I recommend it (of course). It also offers to a greater extent than perspective on higher upward points yesteryear Mike as well as Stephanie. My favorite line, referring to Mike's force for irrational expectations is something unopen to
"I never thought nosotros would come upward to Sweden, that I would live defending the basic new-Keynesian program, as well as that Mike Woodford would live trying to tear it down. Yet hither nosotros are. Promote the financial equation from the footnotes as well as you lot tin sack relieve the rest."Emi Nakamura
Poor Emi had to acquire terminal inwards an exhausting conference of jet-lagged participants. She did a cracking chore (video, slides) roofing a century of monetary history as well as monetary ideas clearly as well as transparently. These are cracking slides to utilisation for an undergraduate or MBA shape on monetary policy, every bit well. An abbreviated list:
- Gold standard
- Seasonal variation inwards involvement rates nether the gilded standard; coin demand shocks
- Money demand shocks inwards the 1980s -- how the supposedly "stable" V inwards MV=PY cruel apart when the Fed pushed on M.
- Theoretical instability / indeterminacy of involvement charge per unit of measurement targets
- The switch to involvement charge per unit of measurement targets as well as corridors inwards operating procedures
- The (near-miraculous) success of inflation targets
- Taylor rules as well as other theory of determinate inflation nether involvement charge per unit of measurement targets
- How is it "monetary economics" without money?
- Why did immense QE non crusade inflation?
Postlude
Mon featured 2 panels, Macroeconomic enquiry as well as the financial crisis: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 critical assessment, amongst Annette Vissing-Jørgensen, Luigi Zingales, Nancy Stokey, as well as Robert Barro ; and Banking as well as finance enquiry as well as the financial crisis: Influenza A virus subtype H5N1 critical assessment amongst Kristin Forbes, Ricardo Reis, Amir Sufi, as well as Antoinette Schoar.
Perhaps it's inwards the nature of panels, but I establish these a disappointment, especially compared to the stellar presentations inwards the chief conference. Also I mean value it would direct keep been improve to allow to a greater extent than (any, really) audience questions; the whole conference was a chip disappointing for lack of full general discussion, especially amongst such a stellar group.
In particular, Luigi led yesteryear excoriating the profession for non paying attending to housing problems as well as financial crises. I thought this a chip unfair as well as simultaneously short-sighted. He singled out monetary economic science textbooks, including Mike Woodford's, for omitting financial crises. Well, Mike omitted asteroid impacts too. It isn't a volume about financial crises. And, after lamabasting all of us, he said non 1 news nigh events since 2009. What are nosotros missing now? I had to stand upward up as well as inquire that rude question, over again suggesting that perchance nosotros are all non listening to Ken Rogoff this time. Annette went on to inquire something similar "don't you lot Chicago people believe inwards whatever regulation at all," as well as the respondents were also polite to tell what an unproductive inquiry that is as well as but motility on.
Again, I offering apologies to authors as well as discussants I didn't acquire to. The whole thing was memorable, but at that spot is only so much I tin sack blog! Do acquire to the site as well as aspect at the other sessions, according to your interests.
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